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The effect of multiple interventions 
to balance healthcare demand 
for controlling COVID‑19 
outbreaks: a modelling study
Po Yang1*, Geng Yang2, Jun Qi3, Bin Sheng4, Yun Yang5*, Shuhao Zhang5, Gaoshan Bi5 & 
Xuxin Mao6
For controlling recent COVID‑19 outbreaks around the world, many countries have implemented 
suppression and mitigation interventions. This work aims to conduct a feasibility study for accessing 
the effect of multiple interventions to control the COVID‑19 breakouts in the UK and other European 
countries, accounting for balance of healthcare demand. The model is to infer the impact of 
mitigation, suppression and multiple rolling interventions for controlling COVID‑19 outbreaks in 
the UK, with two features considered: direct link between exposed and recovered population, and 
practical healthcare demand by separation of infections. We combined the calibrated model with 
COVID‑19 data in London and non‑London regions in the UK during February and April 2020. Our 
finding suggests that rolling intervention is an optimal strategy to effectively control COVID‑19 
outbreaks in the UK for balancing healthcare demand and morality ratio. It is better to implement 
regional based interventions with varied intensities and maintenance periods. We suggest an 
intervention strategy named as “Besieged and rolling interventions” to the UK that take a consistent 
suppression in London for 100 days and 3 weeks rolling intervention in other regions. This strategy 
would reduce the overall infections and deaths of COVID‑19 outbreaks, and balance healthcare 
demand in the UK.
As of 1st April 2020, the ongoing global epidemic outbreak of coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) has spread 
to at least 146 countries and territories on 6 continents, resulted in 896 thousand confirmed cases and over 45 
thousands  deaths1. In the UK, COVID-19 infections and deaths reached 29,478 and 2352, with a mortality ratio 
nearly 7.9%1. For effectively controlling COVID-19 breaks, most countries have implemented two non-pharma-
ceutical interventions: suppression strategy like immediate lockdowns in some cities at epicentre of outbreak; or 
mitigation that slows down but not stopping epidemic for reducing peak healthcare  demand2–8.
However, both above interventions have apparent pros and cons; the effectiveness of any one intervention in 
isolation is  limited4. Taking an example of controlling the COVID-19 epidemic in Wuhan, suppression strategy 
with extremely high intensity (the highest state of emergency) were token by China government from 23nd Janu-
ary 2020 for 50 days, resulting prevention of over 700 thousand national infectious  cases9,10. However, China’s 
first quarter gross domestic product is estimated to a year-on-year contraction to 9%11. In most scenarios, it is 
difficult to conduct an optimal intervention that minimises both growing infections and economic loss in ongo-
ing COVID-19 breakouts.
The effectiveness of intervention strategies is accessed by decline of daily reproduction parameter  Rt, that 
used to measure a transmission potential of a disease. The  Rt of COVID-19 is widely estimated within a range 
of value between 2.5 and  312–16. Its implementation hinges on two parameters: intervention intensity presented 
by average-number contacts per person, and intervention duration counted by  weeks17. The practical impacts 
of applying intervention strategies to certain country are varied in light of many factors including population 
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density, human mobility, health resources, culture issues, etc. It is crucial but hard to know how and when to 
take which level of interventions tailored to the specific situation in each  country18–20.
Targeting at this problem, we aimed to conduct a feasibility study that explored a range of epidemiologi-
cal scenarios by taking different intervention strategies on current information about COVID-19 outbreaks 
in the UK. We assessed the effectiveness of multiple interventions to control outbreaks using a mathematical 
transmission model accounting for available and required healthcare resources by distinguishing self-recovered 
populations, infection with mild and critical cases. By varying the intensity, timing point, period and combina-
tions of multiple interventions, we show how viable it is for the UK to minimise the total number of infections 
and deaths, delay and reduce peak of healthcare demand. We applied the calibrated model to the prediction of 
infection and healthcare resource changes in other 6 European countries based on actual measures they have 
implemented during this period.
The proposed model has the estimations as the following:
• By the date (5th March 2020) of the first report death in the UK, around 7499 people would have already 
been infected with the virus. After taking suppression on 23rd March, the peak of infection in the UK would 
have occurred between 28th March and 4th April 2020; the peak of death would have occurred between 18th 
April and 24th April 2020.
• By 29th April, no significant collapse of health system in the UK have occurred, where there have been suf-
ficient hospital beds for severe and critical cases. But in the Europe, Italy, Spain and France have experienced 
a 3 weeks period of shortage of hospital beds for severe and critical cases, leading to many deaths outside 
hospitals.
• One optimal strategy to control COVID-19 outbreaks in the UK is to take region-level specific intervention. 
If taking suppression with very high intensity in London from 23rd March 2020 for 100 days, and 3 weeks 
rolling intervention between very high intensity and high intensity in non-London regions. The total infec-
tions and deaths in the UK were limited to 9.3 million and 143 thousand; the peak time of healthcare demand 
was due to the 96th day (12th May, 2020), where it needs hospital beds for 68.9 thousand severe and critical 
cases.
• If taking a simultaneous 3 weeks rolling intervention between very high intensity and high intensity in all 
regions of the UK, the total infections and deaths increased slightly to 10 million and 154 thousand; the peak 
time of healthcare occurs at the 97th day (13th May, 2020), where it needs equivalent hospital beds for severe 
and critical cases of 73.5 thousand.
• If too early releasing intervention intensity above moderate level and simultaneously implemented them in 
all regions of the UK, there would be a risk of second wave, where the total infections and deaths in the UK 
possibly reached to 23.4 million and 897 thousand.
Results
Effectiveness of suppression. As shown in Fig. 1, the model reproduced the observed temporal trend 
of cases within London, non-London and the UK. We estimated that by the date (5th March 2020) of the first 
report deaths in the UK, around 7499 people (0.012% of the UK entire population) would have already been 
infected with the COVID-19. Before lifting measures to intensive suppression on 23rd Mach 2020 (the 46th day), 
the UK total infections including exposed and infectious populations would actually reach 349,455, nearly up to 
0.52% of the UK population. This figure suggests that there were nearly 23 times more infections in the UK than 
were reported as confirmed case (6650 on 23rd March 2020). The infections in London nearly occupied about 
22% of the overall UK infections. It meant an exponential growth of total infections between 12th March 2020 
and 1st April 2020.
But after taking intensive suppression on 23rd March in the UK, daily exposed and infectious population 
were greatly reduced. A rapid decline in R has occurred in later March, from 2.61[1.32–4.32] at the 24th day 
(1st March 2020) to 0.69[0.59–0.79] at the 51st day (28th March 2020). It implied implementing suppression 
in the UK performed significantly impact on reduction of infections. In Fig. 1, we also estimated that the peak 
of infection in the UK would have occurred between 29th March and 3rd April 2020; the peak of deaths would 
have occurred between 18th April and 24th April 2020.
We predicted that if UK could continuously implement insensitive suppression, COVID-19 epidemic would 
be able to control by 16th May 2020 (the 100th day), and would be nearly ended by 5th July 2020 (the 150th day). 
In this case, the total deaths by the end on 24th August 2020 in the UK would be about 69,511, where London 
had about 12,921 deaths and non-London regions had about 56,590 deaths.
In comparing to the prediction at Wuhan using our model, the difference was that the peak of daily infectious 
population (E = 50,200) of London was nearly 1.5 times greater than the one in Wuhan (E = 32,880); the peak 
time (the 50th day) of daily infections in London was 18 days later than the one (the 32nd day) in Wuhan. It 
was probably because suppression applied in Wuhan (the 32nd day) was 14 days earlier than London (the 46th 
day). It implied that earlier suppression could reduce infections significantly, but may lead to an earlier peak 
time of healthcare demand.
Effectiveness of mitigation. We simulated that mitigation with low, moderate and high intensity (M = 6, 
8, 10) were taken in both London and non-London regions in the UK at the 46th day (23rd March 2020), as 
show in Fig. 1. Considering that the UK went to delay phase on the 35th day (12th March 2020), M in the UK 
was adjusted to 12 from 12th March 2020 to 23th March 2020.
The simulated results showed that mitigation strategies were able to delay the peak of COVID-19 breakouts 
in the UK but ineffective to reduce total infectious populations. Compared to suppression, mitigation taken in 
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the UK gave a slower decline in R in March, from 2.73[0.97–5.40] on the 24th day (1st March 2020) to 0.98[95% 
CI 0.88–1.09] on the 110th day (27th May 2020). It implied that during this period, there were still much growth 
of infections in the UK. But London had lower R than non-London regions.
We estimated that the peak of daily infectious population would increase to 3.6 million (M = 10) to 1.9 mil-
lion (M = 8) or 0.69 million (M = 6); the peak date of daily infections was about on the 80th (26th April 2020), 
92nd (8th May 2020) and 110th day (26th May 2020). Compared to the situation of implementing suppression, 
the total deaths in the UK would respectively increase to 2.8 million (M = 10) to 2.1 million (M = 8) or 1.1 mil-
lion (M = 6), where London had about 0.38 million (M = 10) to 0.28 million (M = 8) or 0.15 million (M = 6) and 
non-London regions had about 2.4 million (M = 10) to 1.8 million (M = 8) or 1 million (M = 6). The periods of 
COVID-19 epidemic in the UK by taking above mitigations would be extended to over 160, 200 or 300 days.
The result appeared a similar trend as  findings4, taking mitigation intervention in the UK enabled reducing 
impacts of an epidemic by flattening the curve, reducing peak incidence and overall deaths. While total infec-
tious population may increase over a longer period, the final mortality ratio may be minimised at the end. But as 
same as taking suppression, mitigation need to remain in place for as much of the epidemic period as possible.
Figure 1.  Illustration of controlling COVID-19 outbreaks in London and non-London regions by taking 
suppression and mitigation with parameters. (a) London population: 9.30 million; non-London population: 57.2 
million. (b) Suppression Intervention (M = 3), Mitigation Intervention: Low (M = 10). Moderate (M = 8). High 
(M = 6) (E number of exposed, I number of infections, D number of deceased).
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Health demand and deaths in the UK. From 23rd March 2020, the UK began to implement intensive 
suppression policy to enforce extreme social distancing. By 29th April 2020, suppression has been implemented 
for four and half weeks. We used our model to simulate such a period of measure for estimating healthcare 
demand and deaths in the UK. As shown in Fig. 2d, we assumed there were initially 167,589 available hospi-
tal beds, which was estimated by the number of hospital beds available for every 1000 inhabitants in the UK 
 population21. We assumed at the first day (7th Feb 2020), there are 10% of empty hospital beds (16,700) for 
COVID-19 severe and critical patients. In the first phase of the UK until the 35th day (12th March 2020), gov-
ernment has taken measure to release empty hospital beds from 10 to 12%. Between the 35th Day and the 53th 
day (3rd April 2020), the action of empty hospital beds in the UK were accelerated, to achieve up to 18.5% of 
hospital bed availability (31,080). After the 53th day, the total number of available hospital beds has sharply risen 
to 64,080. That is because during that time, several Nightingale Hospitals were opened to offer a large number 
of available beds in the UK.
Based on above assumption, as shown in Fig. 2a, c, our model accurately predicted the growth of daily deaths 
in the UK by 30th April 2020. It appears that the actual number of deaths in the UK on 30th April was 26,771. 
We used the model to predict the total number of deaths in the UK hospital on 30th April is 26,950. This figure 
was on a given assumption that there were around 20% of available hospital beds to supply COVID-19 patients. 
In this case, all patients can be treated inside the hospital and great reduced the deaths number outside the 
hospital. This prediction, shown as an blue line in Fig. 5a, is fully fit with current UK real deaths roll (orange dot 
line). But in Fig. 2b, by 30th April 2020, if the ratio of hospital bed availability reduced to 15%, there would be 
extra 7775 non-hospital deaths; if the ratio was lower to 10%, there would be 19,615 deaths in the hospital, but 
more non-hospital deaths 23,489. This result revealed that UK government implemented strict admission and 
discharge criteria to COVID-19 severe and critical patients for protecting NHS. The hospital bed availability 
continued to be maintained in a good level in preparation of possible second wave.
In the Fig. 2d, the blue curve showed our estimated number of demanded hospital beds for COVID-19 
severe and critical patients. The blue line demonstrated the change of hospital bed availability over time. The 
results appeared that at a period between the 50th day (30th March 2020) and 57th day (7th April 2020), there 
were an amount of non-hospital COVID-19 critical cases, which might lead to increased daily deaths. Expect 
this period, there were sufficient hospital beds for potential COVID-19 patients. It implied that there were no 
significant collapse of NHS in the UK.
Suppression impacts on European countries. We used our model to estimate the impacts of suppres-
sion on controlling infections of other 6 EU countries (Italy, Spain, Germany, France, Belgium and Switzerland), 
as shown in Figs. 3, 4 and 5. Most suppression in other countries began around 10th -17th March (the 28th–40th 
Figure 2.  Predicting the impact of Suppression intervention on the UK healthcare demand: (a) Forecasting 
COVID-19 daily deaths in the UK with varied ratio of available hospital bed; (b) Forecasting COVID-19 
hospital and non-hospital deaths with varied ratio of available hospital bed; (c) Demonstration of our predicted 
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day from first confirmed case). We analyzed data on deaths up to 28th March, giving a 2–3-week window over 
which to estimate the effect of interventions. For each country, we model the number of infections, the number 
of deaths, and R, the effective reproduction number over time. Specific interventions are assumed to have the 
same relative impact on R in each country when they were introduced there and are informed by mortality data 
across all countries.
As shown in Fig. 3, we made a prediction of the total number of infections and deaths in six European 
countries. In Italy, our results suggested that, cumulatively, 0.8 [0.684–0.920] million people have been infected 
as of March 28th, giving an attack rate of 9.8% [3.2–25%] of the population. From 8th February 2020, the total 
number of infections is about 1.9 million, the total number of deaths is about 41 thousand, the true mortality 
rate is 2.17%, and the ratio of hospital bed availability for COVID patients is 15%, where it refers to 85% hospital 
bed occupancy. Spain has seen a similar trend in the number of deaths, and given its smaller population, our 
model estimates that a higher proportion of the population, 1.15% (0.53 [0.46–0.59] million people) have been 
infected to date. From 1st February 2020, the total number of infections is 2 million, the number of deaths is 41 
thousand, and the true mortality rate is 2.07%. Germany is estimated to have one of the lowest attack rates at 
0.51% with 423,193 [348,711–503,599] people infected. From 11th February, the total number of infections is 
about 0.77 million, and the number of deaths is about 11 thousand. The true mortality rate is 1.5%, and the ratio 
of hospital bed availability for COVID patients is 20%. In France from 15th February 2020, the total number 
Figure 3.  Illustration of forecasting infections in 6 European countries (Italy, Spain, Germany, France, Belgium 
and Switzerland) by implementing suppression intervention.
Figure 4.  Illustration change of reproduction number R in 6 European countries (Italy, Spain, Germany, 
France, Belgium and Switzerland) by implementing suppression intervention.
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of infections is about 972,351, and the number of deaths is about 30,532. The true mortality rate is 3.14%, and 
the ratio of hospital bed availability for COVID patients is 10%. In Belgium from 15th February 2020, the total 
number of infections is about 991,412 and the number of deaths is about 19,209. The true mortality rate is 1.93%, 
and the ratio of hospital bed availability for COVID patients is 20%. In Switzerland from 19th February 2020, the 
total number of infections is 104,109 people, the number of deaths is about 2331 people, the real mortality rate 
is 2.2%, and the ratio of hospital bed availability for COVID patients is 25%. We estimate that there have been 
many more infections than are currently reported. The high level of under-ascertainment of infections that we 
estimate here is likely due to the focus on testing in hospital settings rather than in the community. Despite this, 
only a small minority of individuals in each country have been infected, with an attack rate on average of 0.92% 
[0.51%-1.33%] with considerable variation between countries. Our estimates implied that the populations in 
Europe are not close to herd immunity (~ 50–75% if R is 2–4).
Also, Fig. 3 shows total forecasted deaths since the beginning of the epidemic up to and including 30th April 
2020 under our fitted model. For all above countries, our model fits observed deaths data well (Bayesian good-
ness of fit tests). We find that, across 6 countries, since the beginning of the epidemic, 104,000 [86,840–122,720] 
deaths have been averted due to interventions. In Italy and Spain, where the epidemic is advanced, 57,796 
[49,184–67,043] and 42,967 [37,166–48,982] deaths have been averted, respectively. Even in the UK, which is 
much earlier in its epidemic, we predict 9,659 [8,065–11,397] deaths have been averted. These numbers give 
only the deaths averted that would have occurred up to 31st March. If we were to include the deaths of currently 
infected individuals in both models, which might happen after 30th April, then the deaths averted would be 
substantially higher.
As shown in Fig. 4, averaged across all 6 countries, we estimate initial reproduction numbers R of approxi-
mately 2.66 [0.80–4.46]–3.27 [0.66–7.91], which is in line with other estimates. Our results, which are driven 
largely by countries with advanced epidemics and larger numbers of deaths (e.g. Italy, Spain), suggest that these 
interventions have together had a substantial impact on transmission, as measured by changes in the estimated 
reproduction number R. Across all countries we find current estimates of R to range from a posterior mean of 
0.97 [0.75–1.21] for Italy to a posterior mean of 0.95 [0.72–1.20] for Sweden, with an average of 0.96 across the 
6 country posterior means, a 67% reduction compared to the pre-intervention values. Further, with R values 
dropping substantially, the rate of acquisition of herd immunity will slow down rapidly. This implies that the virus 
will be able to spread rapidly should interventions be lifted. While the growth in daily deaths has decreased, due 
to the lag between infections and deaths, continued rises in daily deaths are to be expected for some time. The 
results suggest that interventions will have a large impact on infections and deaths despite counts of both rising.
In Fig. 5, we demonstrated change of health demand of six European countries. It showed that in Italy, Spain 
and France, there were a period of suffering from shortages of available hospital beds, that is, the blue line in the 
figure (the number of beds required) exceeds the red line (available for COVID-19 patient beds), causing some 
patients to fail to be hospitalized in time, and the number of patients outside the Yellow Line Hospital has risen. It 
can be seen that Belgium also has a certain period of shortage of healthcare resources, but compared to the three 
countries mentioned above, the situation is better with less non-hospital critical cases. The charts of Germany and 
Switzerland showed that there were no shortage of healthcare resources leading to non-hospital critical cases in 
both countries. Corresponding to the results shown in Fig. 3, the shortage of healthcare resources in Italy, Spain 
and France has caused the deaths toll to exceed the normal level, making the deaths rate more than 2%, while 
the situation in Belgium is lighter. So the real mortality rate is not as high as 1.9%. In Germany and Switzerland, 
the real mortality rate remains low at around 1.5% owning to enough healthcare resources.
In light of the prediction of our model, it can be seen that the deaths tolls and deaths rates in Italy, Spain and 
France are more than those in Germany, Belgium and Switzerland. The main reason, as presented in Fig. 5, is 
Figure 5.  Illustration healthcare demand in 6 European countries (Italy, Spain, Germany, France, Belgium and 
Switzerland) by implementing suppression intervention.
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the shortage of healthcare resources in Italy, Spain and France leading to high demand for hospital beds than 
current available beds and will continue for a long time. The other reason is a majority of moderate and severely 
ill patients are not able to be hospitalized and thus missed the chance to be saved. The highest mortality rate 
country Italy has higher request on number of hospital beds than their availability during the period of shortage 
of medical resources.
Effectiveness of multiple interventions. We simulated two possible situations in London and the UK 
by implementing rolling interventions as shown in Fig. 6. We assumed that all regions in the UK implemented 
an initial 3 weeks suppression intervention (M = 3) from the 46th day (23rd March 2020) to the 67th day (13rd 
April 2020). Then, two possible rolling interventions were given: 1) to keep suppression in London, and take a 
3 weeks rolling intervention between suppression and high intensity mitigation (M = 5) in non-London regions; 
2) to take 3 weeks rolling intervention between suppression and high intensity mitigation (M = 5) in all UK.
The simulated results in Fig. 6 showed the epidemic appeared a unimodal distribution trend over 350 days, 
longer than the period of suppression. Similar to suppression in Fig. 1, the peak date of infectious population in 
London or non-London regions remain same at the 50th day. After three weeks, rolling intervention with released 
Figure 6.  Illustration of controlling COVID-19 outbreaks in London and non-London regions by taking 
suppression and 3 weeks rolling intervention with parameters (a) London population: 9.30 million; non-London 
population: 57.2 million. (b) Suppression Intervention (M = 3), 3 weeks rolling intervention (M = 3–5-3–5, 
M = 3–4-3–4-3–4) (E number of exposed, I number of infections).
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intensity in non-London regions led to a fluctuation with 4 or 5 peaks of infections until the end of epidemic. 
The total deaths and infectious population in the UK were greatly reduced to a range from 143 to 154 thousand. 
It was about 85–100% more than the outcome of taking suppression in all the UK.
Above two rolling interventions taken in the UK gave a similar trend of R as suppression, where there was 
a fast decline in R in March, from 2.61[1.32–4.32] on the 24th day (1st March 2020) to 0.69[0.59–0.79] on the 
51th day (28th March 2020). It implied that 3 weeks rolling intervention (M = 3 or 5) had equivalent effects on 
controlling transmissions as suppression, but need to be maintained in a longer period of 350 days. From then, 
R value was oscillated between 1.22 [1.04–1.41] and 0.77[0.63–0.92] with the shrinkage of intervention intensity.
Optimal rolling intervention
Apart from previous two 3 weeks rolling interventions, we simulated other possible rolling interventions with 
varied period (2, 3 and 4 weeks) and intervention intensity (M = 4, 5 and 6), as shown in Table 1: (1) the black 
part assumed that an initial 3 weeks suppression intervention (M = 3) from the 46th day (23rd March 2020) to 
the 67th day (13rd April 2020) was first implemented in the UK; then after 13th April 2020, other possible roll-
ing interventions were given. (2) the red part assumed that an continues 6 or 9 weeks suppression intervention 
(M = 3) from the 46th day (23rd March 2020) to the 88th day (4th May 2020) or the 109th day (25th May 2020) 
was first implemented in the UK; then after the 88th or 109th day, other possible rolling interventions were given.
The results in the first scenario revealed that rolling intervention with middle intensity (M = 6) cannot control 
the outbreaks in one year, where the distribution of epidemic was a multimodal trend as similar to mitigation 
outcomes. The overall infections and deaths significantly increased to over 14 million and 268 thousand. While 
the peak time of healthcare demand for severe critical cases delayed to the 112nd–139th day, the total deaths 
of the UK would be double than other rolling interventions with low intensity. Another finding was that given 
equivalent intensity (M = 3 and 5) of rolling interventions, the longer period (4 weeks) led to slight reduction 
of the total deaths to 151,164, compared to 154,569 of 3 weeks rolling and 160,236 of 2 weeks rolling in the UK. 
The peak time of healthcare demand nearly occurred at same: the 84th-111th day; with an equivalent peak value. 
Thus, in balance of total deaths and human mobility restriction, 3 weeks of period might be a feasible choice.
As shown in Table 1 and Fig. 7, we illustrated the results of the second scenarios that the length of initial sup-
pression was extended to 6 or 9 weeks by 4th or 25th May; and then 3 weeks rolling interventions with adjusted 
intensity (M = 3–5) were implemented. It indicated that when suppression in the UK was extended to 6 weeks by 
4th May, later giving 3 or 4 weeks rolling interventions could reduce total infections to 8,951,775 or 9,201,486, 
and the total deaths to 132,121 or 135,590. Compared with the first scenario of starting 3 weeks rolling from 13th 
April, the total infections decreased by 1 million and the total deaths decreased by 15,000. When suppression 
was extended to 9 weeks by 25th May, the total infections and deaths in the UK had further decreased. As shown 
in Fig. 7, we can find that extending the length of suppression can effectively reduce the overall infections and 
deaths and strengthen the effects of multiple interventions.
Table 1.  Performance comparison of rolling interventions in the UK. FMR, Final morality rate = Total deaths/
Total infections; PHSC, peak value of healthcare demand (severe and critical cases); PTSC, peak time of 
healthcare demand; PnH, peak value of non-hospital population; PTnH, peak time of non-hospital population; 
TD, total deaths (UK); TI, total infections (UK); E, End in 1 year; D, distribution (unimodal/multimodal).
Multiple interventions (intensity 3–5) U/M E TI TD PTSC PHSC PTnH PnH FMR (%)
All UK suppression (27 W, until 5th Oct) M = 3 U Y 5,101,783 76,972 70 61,360 57 13,920 1.5
All UK 3 weeks rolling (After 3 W suppression, Rolling start from 13rd April ) M = 3–4 U Y 6,896,541 102,871 70 61,360 57 13,920 1.49
All UK 2 weeks rolling (After 3 W suppression, Rolling start from 13rd April ) M = 3–5 U Y 10,116,715 160,236 84 73,660 57 13,920 1.58
All UK 3 weeks rolling (After 3 W suppression, Rolling start from 13rd April ) M = 3–5 U Y 10,042,694 154,569 97 73,560 57 13,920 1.53
All UK 4 weeks rolling (After 3 W suppression, Rolling start from 13rd April ) M = 3–5 U Y 9,925,852 151,164 111 72,420 57 13,920 1.52
All UK 2 weeks rolling (After 3 W suppression, Rolling start from 13rd April ) M = 3–6 M N 14,159,946 325,904 112 95,650 112 28,990 2.30
All UK 3 weeks rolling (After 3 W suppression, Rolling start from 13rd April ) M = 3–6 M N 14,228,064 319,955 139 97,110 139 30,450 2.24
All UK 4 weeks rolling (After 3 W suppression, Rolling start from 13rd April ) M = 3–6 M N 14,228,569 310,589 113 101,700 113 35,090 2.18
All UK 3 weeks rolling (After 3 W suppression, Rolling start from 13rd April ) M = 3–8 M N 23,351,902 971,622 139 2,287,000 139 162,000 4.16
London suppression (12 W, until 15th June) M = 3, other regions 2 weeks rolling 
(After 3 W suppression, Rolling start from 13rd April ) M = 3–5
U Y 9,427,917 147,394 84 70,410 57 13,920 1.56
London suppression (12 W, until 15th June) M = 3, other regions 3 weeks rolling 
(After 3 W suppression, Rolling start from 13rd April ) M = 3–5
U Y 9,367,882 143,105 96 68,940 57 13,920 1.52
London suppression (12 W until 15th June) M = 3, other regions 4 weeks rolling 
(After 3 W suppression, Rolling start from 13rd April ) M = 3–5
U Y 9,268,946 140,900 110 66,660 57 13,920 1.52
All UK 2 weeks rolling (After 6 W suppression, Rolling start from 4th May ) M = 3–5 M N 8,694,038 128,310 70 61,360 57 13,920 1.47
All UK 3 weeks rolling (After 6 W suppression, Rolling start from 4th May ) M = 3–5 U Y 8,951,775 132,121 70 61,360 57 13,920 1.47
All UK 4 weeks rolling (After 6 W suppression, Rolling start from 4th May ) M = 3–5 U Y 9,201,486 135,590 70 61,360 57 13,920 1.47
All UK 2 weeks rolling (After 9 W suppression, Rolling start from 25th May ) M = 3–5 U Y 7,761,765 114,503 70 61,360 57 13,920 1.47
All UK 3 weeks rolling (After 9 W suppression, Rolling start from 25th May ) M = 3–5 U Y 7,980,859 117,608 70 61,360 57 13,920 1.47
All UK 4 weeks rolling (After 9 W suppression, Rolling start from 25th May ) M = 3–5 U Y 8,166,998 120,494 70 61,360 57 13,920 1.47
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However, the results also indicated that it was possible to control the outbreaks at the 100th-150th day that 
minimized economic loss to the greatest extent. Due to lower population density and less human mobility of 
non-London regions, 3 weeks rolling intervention was appropriated to non-London regions for balancing the 
total infections and economic loss, but the length of this strategy was extended to 300 days.
Also, we demonstrate the prediction of all parameters in Table 1 over different date by implementing multiple 
interventions in the UK in the Supplementary Materials (Sup_Table.1 and Sup_Table.2).
Discussion
Aiming at a balance of infections, deaths and economic loss, we simulated and evaluated how and when to take 
which intensity level of interventions was a feasible way to control the COVID-19 outbreak in the Europe. We 
found rolling intervention between suppression and mitigation with high intensity could be an effective and effi-
cient choice to limit the total deaths but maintain essential mobility for avoiding huge economic lose and society 
anxiety in a long period. Rolling intervention was more effective in smaller cities. Due to lower population density 
and less human mobility, realising some intervention intensity would not lead to a second breakout of COVID-
19 and benefit maintenance of business activities. Considering difference and diversity of industrial structure 
of the regions with large population density and small population density in Europe, hybrid intervention was 
more suitable and effective to control outbreaks. For example, such strategy could complete London outbreak 
with suppression in 3 months and tolerate a longer recovery period of non-London regions taking 3 weeks roll-
ing intervention. The rapid completion of outbreak in the city like London would strongly benefit to economic 
recovery. Other regions maintained essential production and business activities to offer sufficient support.
In above scenarios, our model found that the total infections in the UK was limited to 9.3 million; the total 
deaths in the UK was limited to 143 thousand. Also, the peak time of healthcare demand would occur at the 
70th day (16th April 2020), where it needed sufficient hospital beds to accommodate 61.3 thousand severe and 
critical cases. This scenario echoed that applying suppression at a right time was crucial to delay the peak date of 
healthcare needs and increase available hospital beds for severe and critical cases. We found that while immediate 
suppression being taken in Wuhan at 14 days earlier than London reduced 4.7 times infections, it led to nearly 
2.34 times of severe and critical cases at non-hospital places (Wuhan: Peak 2789 at the 43th day, London, Peak 
1191 at the 57th day). It implied that taking immediate suppression without sufficient hospital beds was risky 
and led to more deaths in the early breakout.
Our finding revealed that implementing suppression intervention required considering other conditions of 
this region like culture difference, industrial structure, etc. Success of immediate suppression in Wuhan relied 
on strict lockdown of human mobility to community level and sufficient resource support from other cities 
or provinces in China. If there were no sufficiently external support, it would be risky to take highly intensive 
suppression to entire country due to shortage of healthcare resources and huge impacts on its economics. In 
Europe, it was hardly to practically implement the same level of intensity as Wuhan. If intensive suppression was 
relaxed at any time points, the transmission would quickly rebound. This was more like a multi-modal curve 
when taking multi-intervention strategies in Fig. 1. Therefore, we concluded that taking rolling intervention 
was more suitable to Europe.
Specifically, this control measure could be named as “Besieged and rolling interventions”, that implements 
hybrid interventions with diverse intensities and different periods of maintenance in region-levels of a country, 
which measure accounts for each region intensities and industrial structure. For many capital cities with high 
population intensity with closer social distance like Beijing, London, Tokyo, New York, their core businesses are 
financial service, banking and high technology, which are easily transferred online. Intensive suppression over 
2 months plus strict isolation contacts potentially control a second wave of COVID-19 outbreak in city. For other 
surrounding regions with low population intensity and larger social distancing, 3–4 weeks rolling interventions 
enable maintaining essential business and production activities, further to provide sufficient support to capital 
cities. While rolling interventions might last for a longer period, earlier release of capital cities ensures economic 
Figure 7.  Total infections and deaths in the scenarios of implementing 3 weeks rolling intervention with 
intensity M = 3 or 5 from different started dates.
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recovery of entire country. It is a possible strategy for many other countries to control the first or potential second 
wave of COVID-19 outbreaks.
Notably, the total infections estimated in our model was measured by Exposed population (asymptomatic), 
which might be largely greater than other works only estimating Infectious population (symptomatic). We found 
that a large portion of self-recovered population were asymptomatic or mild symptomatic in the COVID-19 
breakouts in Wuhan (occupied about 42–60% of the total infectious population). These people might think they 
had been healthy at home because they did not go to hospital for COVID-19 tests. It was one important issue 
that some SEIR model predicted infectious population in Wuhan that 10 times over than confirmed  cases22,23. 
Early release of intensity might increase a risk of the second breakout.
There are some limitations to our model and analysis. First, our model’s prediction depends on an estimation 
of intervention intensity that is presented by average-number contacts with susceptible individuals as infectious 
individuals in a certain region. We assumed that each intervention had equivalent or similar effect on the repro-
duction number in different regions over time. The practical effectiveness of implementing intervention intensity 
might be varied with respect to cultures or other issues of certain county. In the UK or similar countries, how 
to quantify intervention intensity needs an accurate measure of combination of social distancing of the entire 
population, home isolation of cases and household quarantine of their family members. As for implementing 
rolling interventions in Europe, the policy needs to be very specific and well-estimated at each day according to 
the number of confirmed cases, deaths, morality ratio, health resources, etc. Secondly, our model used a variety 
of plausible biological parameters for COVID-19 based on current evidence as shown in Table 1, but these 
assumed values might be varied by populations or countries. For instance, we assumed that average period of 
mild cases to critical cases is 7 days, and average period of elderly people in hospital from severe cases to deaths 
was 14 days, etc. The change of these variables may impact on our estimation of infections and deaths in the 
UK. Lastly, our model assumes a condition that there will be a reasonable growth of available hospital source as 
time goes in the UK after 23rd March 2020. This was actually supported by latest news that Nightingale hospital 
that enables holding 4,000 patients opened at London Excel centre on 4th April  202024. This assumption is also 
applicable to several other European countries. As the demand for medical resources continues to expand, the 
country has begun to expand the available medical resources in its own countries, such as opening temporary 
tent hospitals, etc.
Our results show that taking rolling intervention is one optimal strategy to effectively and efficiently control 
COVID-19 outbreaks in the many European countries. This strategy potentially reduces the overall infections and 
deaths; delays and reduces peak healthcare demand. In future, our model will be extended to investigate how to 
optimise the timing and strength of intervention to reduce COVID-19 morality and specific healthcare demand.
Methods
Mode structure. We implemented a modified SEIR model to account for a dynamic Susceptible [S], Exposed 
[E] (infected but asymptomatic), Infectious [I] (infected and symptomatic) and Recovered [R] or Deceased [D] 
population s state. For estimating healthcare needs, we categorised infectious group into two sub-cases: Mild 
[M] and Critical [C]; where Mild cases did not require hospital beds; Critical cases need hospital beds but pos-
sibly cannot get it due to shortage of health sources. Conceptually, the modified modal is shown in Fig. 8. The 
parameters in this model are shown in Table 2.
Figure 8.  Extended SEMCR model structure: the population is divided into the following six classes: 
susceptible, exposed (and not yet symptomatic), infectious (symptomatic), mild (mild or moderate symptom), 
critical (severe symptom), deceased and recovered (i.e., isolated, recovered, or otherwise non-infectious).
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The model accounted for delays in symptom onset and reporting by including compartments to reflect transi-
tions between reporting states and disease states. Here, this modal assumed that S is initial susceptible population 
of certain region; and incorporated an initial intervention of surveillance and isolation of cases in contain phase 
by a parameter β12,25. If effectiveness of intervention in contain phase was not sufficiently strong, susceptible 
individuals may contract disease with a given rate when in contact with a portion of exposed population E. 
After an incubation period α1, the exposed individuals became the infectious population I at a ratio 1/α1.The 
incubation period was assumed to be 5.8 days13. Once exposed to infection, infectious population started from 
Mild cases M to Critical cases C at a ratio a, Critical cases led to deaths at a ratio d; other infectious population 
finally  recovered26,27. We assumed that COVID-19 can be initially detected in 2 days prior to symptom onset 
and persist for 7 days in mild cases and 14 days to severe  cases28.
Notably, two important features in our model differ with other SIR or SEIR  models12,13. The first one was that 
we built two direct relationships between Exposed and recovered population, infections with mild symptoms 
and recovered population. It was based on an observation of COVID-19 breakouts in Wuhan that a large portion 
(like 42.5% in Wuhan) of self-recovered population were asymptomatic or mild  symptomatic14. They did not go 
to hospital for official COVID-19 tests but actually were infected. Without considering this issue, the estimation 
of total infections were greatly  underestimated13. In order to measure portion of self-recovery population, we 
assumed that exposed individuals at home recovered in 3–5 days; mild case at home recovered in 7–10 days19. 
But if their symptoms get worse, they will be transferred to hospital.
The second feature was to consider shortage of health sources (hospital beds) in the early breakouts of 
COVID-19 might lead to more deaths, because some severe or critical cases cannot be accommodated in time 
and led to deaths at home (non-hospital). For instance, in Wuhan, taking an immediate suppression interven-
tion on 23rd Jan 2020 increased serious society anxiety and led to a higher mortality rate. In order to accurately 
quantify deaths, our modal considered percentage of elder people in the UK at a ratio occupancy of available 
NHS hospital beds over time at a ratios  Ht and their availability for COVID-19 critical cases at a ratio  Jt. We 
assumed that critical cases at non-hospital places led to deaths in 4 days; elderly people in critical condition at 
hospital led to deaths in 14 days, and non-elderly people in critical condition at hospital led to deaths in 21 days28.
One parameter was defined to measure intervention intensity over time as  Mt, which was presented by average 
number of contacts per person per day. We assumed that transmission ratio βequals to the product of interven-
tion intensity  Mt and the probability of transmission (b) when exposed (i.e., hospital In Wuhan, intervention 
intensity was assumed within [3–15], and gave with a relatively accurate estimation of COVID-19  breakouts23. 
We calibrated its value with respect to the population density and human mobility in London and the UK, and 
estimated outcomes of COVID-2019 outbreaks by implementing different interventions.
All data and code required to reproduce the analysis is available online at: https ://githu b.com/Turtl eZZH/
Compa rison -of-Multi ple-Inter venti ons-for-Contr ollin g-COVID -19-Outbr eaks-in-Londo n-and-the-UK.
Table 2.  Parameters estimation in our model.
Name Representation Value References
N UK population by Aug 2019 66 million 29
i Efficiency of isolation contacts 0.88–1.00 Tested
β1 Transmission rate from I to S 0.157
23
β2 Transmission rate from E to S 0.787
23
α1 Incubation period 5.8 days
23
α2 Average period from M to C 7 days
28
ɤ1 Average period from E to R 5 days Assumed
ɤ2 Average period from M to R 7 days
28
ɤ3 Average period from non-H to R 42 days Assumed
ɤ4 Average period of older people from H to R 21 days Assumed
ɤ5 Average period from non-older people from H to R 14 days Assumed
d1 Average period from non-H to D 4 days Assumed
d2 Average period of older people from H to D 14 days
28
d3 Average period of non-older people from H to D 28 days
28
m Proportion of mild case 0.80 28
s Proportion of severe case 0.138 28
c Proportion of critical case 0.061 28
Bt Number of hospital beds in the UK 167,589
21
O Percentage of people over 65 in the UK 0.18 30
Ht Percentage of unoccupied hospital beds 0.20–0.60 Assumed
Jt Percentage of available hospital beds for COVID-19 critical cases 0.8–1 Assumed
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Data sources and modal calibration. Considering that COVID-19 breakouts in Wuhan nearly ended 
by taking suppression intervention, our model was first fitted and calibrated with data on cases of COVID-19 
in  Wuhan23. In Fig. 1 it showed how suppression (M = 3) impacted on the total number of infections and deaths 
over time during January 2020 and April 2020. In comparing to other strategies, it demonstrated that the total 
infections of Wuhan greatly reduced and led an earlier peak time on the 42nd day (2nd Feb 2020. The end time of 
releasing suppression was due to the 123th day (23rd April 2020). It showed that mitigation (M = 6) in Wuhan on 
the 32nd day may lead to 5–6 times more total infections than suppression, although it would delay the outbreak. 
If Wuhan took a 2 weeks rolling mitigation and suppression intervention (M = 6 or 3), the total infections might 
be increased 1.5 times more infections than suppression, although it would delay the outbreak.
Using Wuhan.5 infection our estimation was close to the practical trend of outbreaks in Wuhan, and gave 
similar results to other  works21,23. We tested that transmission rate from I to S is about 0.157; transmission rate 
from E to S is about 0.78723. The incubation period was assumed to be 6 days13. As for other parameters, we fol-
lowed the COVID-19 official report from  WHO28, and gave a medium estimation on average durations related 
from infectious, to mild or critical case, and deceased or recovery were shown in Table 2.
Regard as the percentage of elderly people in the UK, it was assumed as 18%30. The total number of NHS 
hospital beds was given as 167,589 with an initial occupied ratio up to 85%30. Considering that UK government 
began to release NHS hospital beds after COVID-19 breakouts, we assumed the occupied ratio reduced to 80% 
and would further fall to 40% by 4th April, 2020. Accounting for other serious disease cases requiring NHS hos-
pital beds in the early breakout of COVID-19, we assumed that a ratio of available hospital beds for COVID-19 
critical cases was initially at 80%, and gradually raised to 100%.
The intervention intensity was related to the population density and human mobility. We gave an initialization 
to London and non-London regions: London (M = 15, population: 9.3 million), non-London regions (M = 14, 
population: 57.2 million). After taking any kind of interventions, we assumed the change of M would follow a 
reasonable decline or increase in 3–5 days.
Procedure. Due to difference of population density between London and other regions in the UK, we 
observed a fact that the accumulative infections in London was about one third of the total infectious population 
in the  UK21. We separately combined the calibrated model with data on the cases of COVID-19 in London, the 
UK (non-London) and the UK during February 2020 and March 2020 to estimate the total number of infections 
and deaths, and also peak time and value of healthcare demand by applying different interventions. In contain 
stage, we assumed a strategy of isolation contacts were taken in the UK from 6th Feb 2020 to 12th March 2020, 
the effectiveness of isolation of cases and contacts was assumed as 78% in London and 91% in non-London 
regions.
The key tuning operation was to adjust intensity level of  Mt over time. We assumed that suppression intensity 
was given to reduce unaltered internal mobility of a region, where: M = 3. Mitigation intensity was given a wide 
given range [4–12], where high intensity (M = 4 or 5), moderate intensity (M = 6–8), low intensity (M = 9–12), 
We evaluated effectiveness of multiple interventions in London and non-London regions, including: suppres-
sion, mitigation and rolling intervention. The evaluation metric included 9 indicators as follow: 1. Unimodal 
or multimodal distribution. 2. If outbreak ends in one year. 3. Total infections. 4. Total deaths. 5. Peak time of 
healthcare demand. 6. Peak value of healthcare demand for severe and critical cases. 7. Peak time of non-hospital 
population. 8. Peak value of non-hospital population. 9. Final morality rate (equals to Total deaths over Total 
infections). The length of intervention was calculated due the date that daily new infections were nearly clear.
Respect to definition of optimal interventions, we first conducted a condition that COVID-19 outbreaks 
ended as early as possible, and definitely not lasted over 1 year, otherwise it consistently impacted on economic 
recovery. The second condition was a good balance between total Infections or deaths and intervention intensity. 
The last one was later peak time and smaller peak value of healthcare demand, where it gave sufficient time to 
prepare essential health sources.
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